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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to explore the role of judicial review of legislation in the UK from a 
legal constitutionalist’s point of view. After having introduced the reader to the origins of 
judicial review of legislation in general and the two theoretical models of constitutionalism, 
the UK’s system of constitutionalism will be analysed in particular. In this context, the 
process of “juridification” and “judicalisation” will be discussed in order to show that the 
British doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty - famously articulated by Dicey in 1885 - is 
currently under attack.   
 
The main focus of this research paper is on the theory of common law constitutionalism (CLC 
theory), according to which the common law is seen as constituting a higher order of law, a 
moral ideal and a superior form of public reason, and therefore the ultimate controlling 
factor of Parliament’s actions. On the basis of the academic theory, the judicial reception of 
this theory will be analysed with particular attention to the House of Lords’ decision in 
Jackson in 2005. 
 
It will be argued that the system of the common law constitutionalism in the UK is not very 
different from the system of legal constitutionalism: Firstly, fundamental principles 
embedded in the common law like the rule of law are similar to constitutional principles of 
codified supreme constitutions, providing for benchmarks of judicial review of legislation. 
Secondly, the requirement of exceptional circumstances for invalidating legislation in the 
CLC system corresponds to the idea of (strong) judicial self-restraint in legal 
constitutionalist systems. 
 
 
Word length 
 
The text of this research paper (including footnotes but excluding abstract, table of contents 
and bibliography) comprises 15898 words.   
 
Subjects and topics 
 
Judicial Review of Legislation 
Political and Legal Constitutionalism 
Parliamentary Sovereignty 
Fundamental Common Law Principles  
Judicial Self-Restraint 
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I Introduction 
 
The UK courts cannot review Parliament’s laws because there is nothing against which they 
can review them. Reviewing the exercise of parliamentary sovereignty in the UK would be as 
pointless an exercise … as comparing two copies of the same edition of the morning 
newspaper with each other to check whether what they report on page one actually happened.1 
 
The UK is one of the few states in the modern world where the constitution is not codified in 
one single written document. For legally trained people from states that operate under a 
codified supreme constitution, the UK’s constitutional arrangements seem to lack an object: a 
document called  “the constitution”, on the basis of which constitutional courts can review 
legislation of Parliament.  
 
Furthermore, finding the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty to be the most basic postulate 
in British constitutional law, non-UK jurists immediately raise the question if judicial review 
of legislation – if legitimate at all - is not pointless within this constitutional framework as it 
seems to be impossible to allow judges to strike down legislation thereunder. However, more 
and more UK legal professionals invoke that judicial review of legislation including the 
power to strike it down must be admissible even within the British constitutional framework. 
 
Consequently, the aim of this paper is to explore the role of judicial review of legislation in 
the UK from a legal constitutionalist’s point of view: Having introduced the reader to the 
origins of judicial review of legislation in general and the two theoretical models of political 
and legal constitutionalism (II), I will analyse the UK’s system of constitutionalism in 
particular (III). In this context, the process of “juridification” and “judicalisation” will be 
discussed in detail in order to show that the British doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty - 
famously articulated by Dicey in 1885 - is currently under attack.   
 
The main focus of this research paper is on the theory of common law constitutionalism 
(CLC theory), according to which the common law is seen as constituting a higher order of 
law, a moral ideal and a superior form of public reason, and therefore the ultimate controlling 
factor of Parliament’s actions. On the basis of academic theory, part IV of this paper will 
analyse the judicial reception of this theory, paying particular attention to the House of 
Lords’ decision in Jackson v the Attorney General2 in 2005. In this case, some judges 
indicated in obiter that there might be some fundamental principles embedded in the common 
law that constrain the supremacy of Parliament and allow for judicial review of legislation 
including the power to strike it down in exceptional circumstances.  
 
                                               
1 Anthony Clarke and John Sorabji “The Rule of Law and Our Changing Constitution” in Mads Andenas and 
Duncan Fairgrieve  (ed) Tom Bingham and the Transformation of the Law: A Liber Amicorum (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, New York, 2009) 39 at 54. 
2 Jackson v Attorney-General [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262 at [102] [Jackson]. 
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The final questions to be examined in part IV will be the following: Is there is a power to 
strike down legislation of Parliament stemming from fundamental common law principles in 
the uncodified British constitution that can be equated with constitutional principles 
embodied in codified constitutions? Is the system of the exceptional exercise of judicial 
review of legislation according to the CLC theory similar to the principle of judicial self-
restraint in the concept of legal constitutionalism?  
 
 II Judicial Review of Legislation 
 
A Origins of Judicial Review 
 
1 Dr Bonham’s Case (1610) 
 
The idea of having a judicial power to review legislation within the constitutional system of a 
state can be traced back to 1610. In Dr Bonham’s Case3, Lord Coke stated: 4 
 
In many cases, the common law will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge 
them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or 
repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such 
Act to be void. 
 
Whereas some argue that this dictum symbolises the foundation of judicial review of 
legislation,5 others maintain that Lord Coke did not intend to advocate a doctrine of judicial 
review.6  With reference to the historical context and Coke’s other case reports it must be 
noted that there is a somewhat controversial meaning of the terms “control”, “void”, 
“repugnant” and “common right and reason”.7 It has been argued that these terms were 
widely phrased and therefore need to be read in the context of the dictum, which hereafter  
“visualise[d] no statute void because of a conflict between it and common law, natural law, or 
higher law, but simply a refusal to follow a statute absurd on its face”.8 Critics say 
furthermore, that it is unclear if Coke in his dictum referred to “Parliament” as a legislative or 
judicial body in this context.9  Together, these factors cast some doubt on whether this dictum 
advocates the doctrine of judicial review of legislation or whether it merely expresses a 
                                               
3 Thomas Bonham v College of Physicians (1610) 8 Co Rep 107a, 77 ER 638 (Comm Pleas) [Dr. Bonham’s 
Case]. 
4 At 118a. 
5 See e.g. Douglas Edlin Judges and Unjust Laws: Common Law Constitutionalism and the Foundations of 
Judicial Review (University of Michigan Press, USA, 2008) at 7; 55. Raoul Berger “Doctor Bonham’s Case: 
Statutory Construction or Constitutional Theory?” (1969) 117 U Pa L Rev 521; Phillip Joseph Constitutional 
and Administrative Law in New Zealand (3 ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2007) at 488 et seq.; 518.  
6 See e.g. Theodore Plucknett “Bonham’s Case and Judicial Review” (1926) 40 Harv L Rev 30; Samuel Thorne 
“Dr. Bonham’s Case” (1938) 54 LQR 543. 
7 See e.g. Thorne, above n 6, at 548 et seqq. 
8 At 548. 
9 Jeffrey Goldsworthy The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, New York, 1999) at 40; 45; 61 et seq.; 114 et seqq. 
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technique of statutory interpretation, demanding for harmonisation of statutes with the 
common law.  
 
2 Marbury v Madison (1803) 
 
Regardless of its interpretation, Coke’s statement made in Dr Bonham’s Case did not lead to 
a growth of judicial review of legislation in the UK in the following centuries, as it did not 
receive systematic judicial sanction.10 However, the idea of judicial review of legislation had 
been born and was transferred to British colonies and new states, where Coke’s books were 
highly influential, e.g. British America11.12  
 
In the US, the Supreme Court clearly stated in the landmark case Marbury v Madison13 in 
1803 that it is for the judges to review legislation of Parliament.14 According to the US 
Supreme Court judges can strike down legislation in the case where it is unconstitutional. 
Marshall CJ held that this judicial power was inherent in the US Constitution itself, which 
demanded for judges to help to enforce the supreme character of the constitution.15   
 
It must be noted that the US Supreme Court referred to the idea of judicial review of 
legislation in Marbury v Madison in the context of a system which has a written constitution, 
wherefore justification for judicial review could be found in the written supreme constitution 
itself rather than in “common right and reason”:16  
  
The particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens 
the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the 
constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that 
instrument. 
 
Before this case, during legal and public campaigns in British America, Dr Bonham's Case 
was often used as a justification for nullifying primary legislation.17 In Marbury v Madison, 
however, Coke was not explicitly mentioned on the crucial point of striking down legislation. 
Therefore, it is difficult to determine in how far the ruling of the US Supreme Court was 
based on Coke’s obiter: On the one hand, it can be argued that the judges made deliberate 
                                               
10 By 1772, William Blackstone’s clearly expressed contrary view gained widespread acceptance, meaning that 
common law courts had no authority to set aside legislation, see Philip Hamburger Law and Judicial Duty 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 2008) at 278. 
11 United States of America since Declaration of Independence in 1776. 
12 See Hamburger, above n 10, at 274 et seqq. or George Fletcher and Steve Sheppard American Law in a 
Global Context: The Basics (Oxford University Press, New York, 2005) at 133.  
13 William Marbury v James Madison 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) [Marbury v Madison]. 
14 See 178 et seqq. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Marbury v Madison, above n 13, at 180 (emphasis added). 
17 E.g. used by James Otis in his argumentation against the statutory authority of “writs of assistances” in the 
Writs of Assistance Case in 1761 as well as more generally in his argumentation against unconstitutional 
statutes in his pamphlet The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved in 1764, see Hamburger, above 
n 10, at 275. 
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references to Coke by using the terms “repugnant” and “void”.18 On the other hand, both, the 
aforementioned ambiguity of these terms used by Coke and a subsequent American Supreme 
Court case in 1883, Hurtado v California19, according to which Coke’s obiter in Dr 
Bonham’s case was explicitly referred to as not having affected “the omnipotence of 
Parliament over the common law”,20 cast doubts on the question if the US Supreme Court 
really had Coke’s obiter in mind when reaching its conclusion in Marbury v Madison.21 
Whatever view might be correct, it cannot be denied that with the reasoning in Marbury v 
Madison, the Americans established the doctrine of judicial review in their constitutional 
tradition –  leaving it open to interpretation if there might have been a “higher” idea of 
“common right and reason” behind their findings or not.  
 
3 Development of Judicial Review  
 
As a means of both protecting individuals’ rights and policing the federal distribution of 
powers, the idea of judicial review has gained widespread acceptance not only in the US but 
also in other countries all over the world.22 Nowadays, judicial review of legislation is a 
feature in most democratic common law and civil law constitutional systems, varying from a 
weak judicial review, where legislation can only be interpreted alongside the legislative 
intention, to a strong judicial review in countries where Acts of Parliament can even be struck 
down.23 In Europe, the creation of constitutional courts was mainly inspired by the American 
Marbury v Madison decision. Being created in the post-second World War era, most of these 
constitutional courts nowadays have greater powers than the American role model as they are 
even allowed to abstractly review legislation of Parliament.24 
Generally speaking, whereas the roots of judicial review of legislation might be said to lie in 
the common law regarding Coke’s statement in Dr Bonham’s Case, the American case of 
Marbury v Madison provides a good example that judicial review of legislation is easily 
                                               
18 Noah Feldman "The Voidness of Repugnant Statutes: Another Look at the Meaning of Marbury" (2004) 148 
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 27 at 29 et seqq. For the general influence of Coke’s views 
on American constitutional law see Edward Corwin “The ‘Higher Law’ Background of American Constitutional 
Law” (1929) 42 Harv L Rev 365 at 371: “From his [Coke’s] work many of them early found their way into 
American judicial decisions, sometimes as interpretative of the written constitution, sometimes as 
supplementary of it”. 
19 See e.g. Hurtado v People of California 110 US 516 (1883) [Hurtado v California]. 
20 Ibid, at 531. 
21 So e.g. Gary McDowell "Coke, Corwin and the Constitution: The 'Higher Law Background' Reconsidered" 55 
The Review of Politics 393, who argues that Coke’s reasoning was not influential for the understanding of the 
establishment of judicial review in America. 
22 In Europe, the idea of judicial review of legislation became popular during the 20th century, with Austria as 
the first country to introduce that idea, see Tim Koopmans Courts and Political Institutions: A Comparative 
View (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) at 41 et seq.  
23 Compare for a strong judicial review e.g. India (as a common law country) and Germany (as a civil law 
country). 
24 Fletcher and Sheppard, above n 12, at 146. See e.g. Basic Law 1949 (Germany), art 93 (1): “The Federal 
Constitutional Court shall rule: … 2. in the event of disagreements or doubts concerning the formal or 
substantive compatibility of federal law or Land law with this Basic Law, or the compatibility of Land law with 
other federal law, on application of the Federal Government, of a Land government, or of one fourth of the 
Members of the Bundestag”.  
 9 
 
justified in a system with a codified (supreme) constitution, where the constituent power has 
explicitly conferred this power to the judiciary.25  
B Legitimacy of Judicial Review 
1 Legal Constitutionalism vs. Political Constitutionalism 
The legitimacy of judicial review is linked to the idea of constitutionalism26 and therefore 
varies within the two constitutional conceptions27 that determine how government’s power 
shall be constrained: legal constitutionalism and political constitutionalism.28 
 
Legal constitutionalists demand for legal limits on the government’s actions and legally 
enshrined rights for individuals that should be enforced through the judiciary. Therefore, 
legal constitutionalism can be equated with constitutional or judicial supremacy.29 The 
legitimacy of judicial review is inherent in this concept, leaving it for the courts to uphold the 
constitutional values enshrined in the supreme constitution.30   
By contrast, political constitutionalists demand for political limits on the government’s 
actions and rights and liberties for individuals. In political constitutionalism, these rights and 
liberties can be legalized by statutes or in the common law “as long as they are politically 
changeable and controllable through ordinary, politically accountable decision-making of the 
legislature”.31 Thus, the legitimacy of judicial review is not based on a supreme constitution 
but simply on the idea of checks and balances within the ordinary political system.32 
Demanding for democratic mechanisms to have the last say, this model incorporates a huge 
scepticism towards judicial review.33 With regard to judicial review of the legislative process, 
                                               
25 See also Alexander Hamilton “The Federalist, 78” in Lawrance Goldman (ed) Alexander Hamilton, James 
Madison, and John Jay: The Federalist Papers (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2008) 379 at  
382, who argues for a three-way relationship between the people, the constitution and the legislative body, 
which leaves it to the court to ensure that the people’s will declared in the constitution will not be undermined 
by the legislative body.  
26 See Clarke, above n 1, at 44.  
27 See Stephen Gardbaum “What is the New Commonwealth Model and What is New About It?“ in Stephen 
Gardbaum (ed) The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, New York 2013) 21 at 21 et seqq. 
28 See generally on the importance of judicial review of legislation in constitutional democracies Martin 
Loughlin “Judicial Independence and Judicial Review in Constitutional Democracies: A Note on Hamilton and 
Tocqueville in  Christopher Forsyth, Mark Elliot, Swati Jhaveri, Michael Ramsden and Anne Scully-Hill (ed) 
Effective Judicial Review: A Cornerstone of Good Governance (Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 
2010) 9. 
29 Gardbaum, above n 27, at 22. 
30 See e.g. Basic Law 1949 (Germany), art 93 and art 100 about the jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional 
Court in cases where constitutional rights might have been affected by one of the three branches of government. 
These constitutional rights are not changeable by normal political means, see e.g. Basic Law 1949 (Germany), 
art 79 about the amendment of the Basic Law. 
31 Gardbaum, above n 27, at 23. 
32 At 22.  
33 See e.g. Richard Bellamy Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of 
Democracy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, 2007) at 145; 260.  
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courts generally have no or very limited power to review legislation of Parliament, not going 
further than interpreting and applying the law.34 
2 Critiquing Both Models 
Both models incorporate conceptual strengths and weaknesses:  
The most important strength of the model of legal constitutionalism lies in the fact that this 
system seems to be able to temper majority rule by rights-based judicial control35 having 
judges that are impartial and independent from popular support, but bound by the 
constitutional document. The biggest conceptual advantage of political constitutionalism, 
however, is that it is highly democratic, leaving it to the elected MPs instead of a few judges 
to have the last say concerning the government of the people. 
By contrast, according to critics, the main weakness of the model of legal constitutionalism is 
that is antidemocratic in that just a few judges have the final say concerning the validity of 
legislation and that the legitimacy of the judges does not directly stem from the popular will 
expressed through elections.36  Furthermore, the boundaries between merely judicial 
constitutional control on the one hand and judge-made law on the other hand are floating.37 
Therefore, this concept is prone to result in a system where the courts become an alternate 
legislator while pretending that they just exercise their function as guardians of the 
constitution.38 
The model of political constitutionalism, on the other hand, entails a different problem: its 
biggest advantage of being flexible is simultaneously its biggest disadvantage. The 
omnipotence of the political majoritarian view is always at risk of encountering or even 
suppressing the civil liberties of the citizens.39 In this system,  the courts’ limited role of just 
being able to interpret Parliament’s will cannot provide for sufficient mechanisms to come to 
someone’s defence against Parliament.40 Therefore, the biggest conceptual weakness of the 
                                               
34 For a general critique of judicial review of legislation by political constitutionalists, see Paul Craig “Political 
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review” in Christopher Forsyth, Mark Elliot, Swati Jhaveri, Michael Ramsden 
and Anne Scully-Hill (ed) Effective Judicial Review: A Cornerstone of Good Governance (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford New York, 2010) 19 at 19 et seqq. 
35 See Craig “Political Constitutionalism and Judicial Review” in Christopher Forsyth, Mark Elliot, Swati 
Jhaveri, Michael Ramsden and Anne Scully-Hill (ed) Effective Judicial Review: A Cornerstone of Good 
Governance (Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) at 23. 
36 Jeremy Waldron “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review” (2006) 115 Yale LJ 1346 at 1346. See also 
Alexander Bickel The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (2nd ed, Yale 
University Press, New Haven and London, 1986) at 16 et seqq., who describes this problem of the courts  as a 
“counter-majotarian difficulty”. 
37 See for this problematic development of juridification (of political issues) by the (German) constitutional 
court Markus Ogorek “Die Lehre von der sog. Parlamentssouveränität in rechtsvergleichender Perspektive” 
[2006] JA 151 at 155 (translation: “The Doctrine of the So-Called Parliamentary Sovereignty From a Legal 
Comparative Perspective”). 
38 See Jonathan Morgan “Law’s British Empire“ (2002) 22 OJLS 729 at 744 at seq. 
39 Ogorek, above n 37, at 155. 
40 Ibid. 
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model of political constitutionalism seems to be the lack of mechanisms for the individual’s 
best.41  
There might be several ways of improving these two models legitimising judicial review of 
legislation:  
Firstly, concerning the model of political constitutionalism, it is obvious that the court’s role 
as a “guardian of the constitution” must be implemented in a way conformable to this model, 
allowing for judicial review of legislation in cases where the individual’s rights are at risk. A 
possible form would be to allow judges to invoke abstract principles of morality or natural 
law as political means standing above the majority will of Parliament and being justified by 
the constituent power itself, the people.42  In the absence of a supra-legislative constitution, 
the courts’ allegiance should be to the people and their moral values.43  
Secondly, concerning the model of legal constitutionalism, a form of “judicial self-restraint”, 
according to which the constitutional court itself limits its powers concerning new laws or 
policies and only acts in line with the principle of subsidiarity in order to uphold the authority 
of the legislature, namely the democratic will, might be a way to overcome the inherent 
conceptual problem but also to ensure that the individual’s rights will not be misused by the 
majority will.44   
To conclude, whereas the model of political constitutionalism can hardly justify a bigger role 
for the judiciary than statutory interpretation without invoking “higher” law or principles of 
morality, the model of legal constitutionalism has no dogmatic problem with the justification 
of judicial review of legislation in a wide sense, including the power to strike it down. In the 
latter model, the danger rather lies with the power conferred to some judges misusing their 
power and threatening democracy. 
III The UK’s Model of Constitutionalism and the Power of Judicial Review 
of Legislation 
Unlike most of the countries in the world, the UK has a constitution that is said to be 
uncodified.45 Instead of being embodied in one single constitutional document, the British 
constitution has multiple sources, being both legal, like statutes and the common law, and 
non-legal in the form of constitutional conventions.46  
 
                                               
41 Contrast Waldron, above n 36, at 1346, who believes that judicial review can on no account provide better 
rights protection than via democratic legislatures. 
42 Compare idea of CLC theory discussed under III.B.2. 
43 See Joel Colón-Riós “The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty and the Road not Taken: Democratizing 
Amendment Rules” (2012) 25 Can J L & Jurisprudence 53 at 73 et seqq., who further develops this idea by 
saying that the citizens should even be allowed to react to controversial judicial decisions. 
44 See e.g. model in Germany. On this point in detail, see analysis under IV.B.2. 
45 Sometimes also referred to as unwritten even though that term might be incorrect if one bears in mind that 
there exist written documents forming part of the constitution. Apart from the UK, only New Zealand and Israel 
have this special form of constitutional framework. 
46 Adam Tomkins Public Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2003) at 9 et seq. 
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A Orthodox Diceyan View: The Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
Traditionally, the UK has favoured the model of political constitutionalism47 that is linked to 
the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty. Being developed under the “Glorious Revolution” 
in 1688,48 the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty has found its famous authoritative 
description by Dicey, who explained its nature as follows:49 
The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than this, namely, 
that Parliament thus defined [i.e. as the “Queen in Parliament”] has, under the English 
constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and further, that no person or 
body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the 
legislation of Parliament. 
This statement expresses Dicey’s orthodox view on this doctrine, consisting of a positive and 
a negative limb: positively, that Parliament – consisting of the House of Commons, the 
House of Lords and the Monarch -  may make any law whatsoever and negatively, that no 
body can set aside Acts of Parliament as Parliament is seen as constituting the supreme 
legislative authority or power in the British constitution.50  
The positive limb allows Parliament to repeal statutes even implicitly, as Parliament cannot 
bind itself or its successors on this orthodox reading.51 Accordingly, entrenchment of any 
legislation hereafter is impossible. Even longstanding Acts of Parliament, like the Magna 
Carta,52 could be repealed anytime. The important statement of this doctrine for the purpose 
of this paper, however, lies in its negative limb, the allocation of competences: As no body 
has the right to override or set aside primary legislation, the courts have no right to exercise 
judicial review of legislation in a wide sense.53 Besides, the positive limb of Dicey’s doctrine 
may be related to judicial review of legislation, since hereafter courts cannot even use a 
principle protected in an earlier statute to invalidate an inconsistent statute passed afterwards. 
It must be noted that Dicey found a second cardinal rule at the heart of the British 
constitution – the rule of law.54 Generally speaking, the rule of law, although being 
“notoriously vague and contested”, basically implies that not only the governed people but 
                                               
47 See John Griffith “The Political Constitution” (1979) 42 MLR 1. 
48 The “Glorious Revolution” is commonly seen as an event having shifted the substantial power from the 
sovereign to Parliament by sweeping aside any limitation on the power of Parliament, see e.g. Joseph, above n 
5, at 498.  
49 Albert Venn Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885) (10 ed, Macmillan & Co, 
London, 1959) at 39 et seq. 
50 Dicey’s categories have been rephrased by Eleftheriadis in terms of “power” for the positive limb and 
“immunity” for the negative limb, see Pavlos Eleftheriadis “Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Constitution” 
(2009) 22 Can J L & Jurisprudence 267 at 268. 
51 See Ellen Street Estates v Minister of Health [1934] I KB 590 (CA) at 597: “The Legislature cannot … bind 
itself as to the form of subsequent legislation, and it is impossible for Parliament to enact that in a subsequent 
statute dealing with the same subject-matter there can be no implied repeal.” 
52 Magna Carta 1297 (UK). 
53 See Ian Loveland Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, and Human Rights: A Critical Introduction (6 ed, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 23. 
54 Tomkins, above n 46, at 21. 
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also the government itself should be ruled by the law and subject to the law.55 It is evident 
that the rule of law understood as a legal principle conflicts with the doctrine of 
Parliamentary supremacy.56 Dicey dissolved this conflict by conceptualising the rule of law 
in a narrow sense, i.e. more in a way of a political ideal than a legal principle, therefore 
subordinate to the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy, thus not advocating for legal 
constitutionalism. 57 
Consequently, according to the orthodox view in line with Dicey, judicial review of 
legislation is extremely limited58 and only exercised in terms of statutory interpretation 
according to the will of Parliament.59 In the Diceyan theory, there is no place for a  “higher 
law” above the will of Parliament such as natural law or divine law that could be invoked by 
the courts in order to find a statute ‘unconstitutional’.60 As Lord Simon expressed it in Pickin 
in 1974, the UK courts have traditionally held the view that they have “no power to declare 
enacted law to be invalid”.61 On this reading, Parliamentary sovereignty is an absolute 
principle to which the rule of law is subordinate. Therefore, no body – not even the judiciary 
– is under any circumstances capable of setting aside an Act of Parliament.  
B Developing Modern View: Limits on Parliament’s Power 
By contrast, a modern view has developed whereby there are legal constraints on Parliament 
to be enforced by the courts. According to this view, the hierarchy between the conflicting 
principles of Parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law is not as clear as traditionally 
accepted by Dicey and his orthodox followers. Seeing the rule of law as “the bedrock of 
liberal democratic constitutionalism”62, advocates of the modern view rather see the principle 
of parliamentary sovereignty as a somewhat relative principle that is challenged by legal 
constraints set both by Parliament itself and by fundamental values embedded in the common 
law (“common law constitutionalism”).63 
1 Parliament’s “Self-Restrictions” 
The self-restrictions of Parliament itself can be classified into two groups: legal theory and 
legal practise. 
                                               
55 Jeffrey Goldsworthy Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, New York, 2010) at 61 et seqq. 
56 See e.g. Francis Jacobs The Sovereignty of Law: The European Way (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2007) at 8, who even argues that the rule of law is incompatible with the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty. 
Contrast Goldsworthy, above n 55, at 57. 
57 Tomkins, above n 46, at 21.  
58 The strongest opponents of rights-based judicial review of legislation in the UK are Waldron and Bellamy, 
see Jeremy Waldron “The Core of the Case against Judicial Review“ (2006) 115 Yale LJ 1346 and Bellamy, 
above n 23.  
59 See Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1993] AC 593 (HL), a case which established the principle of 
statutory interpretation by reference to Parliamentary material if legislation is ambiguous. 
60 Loveland, above n 53, at 23. 
61 British Railways Board and Others v Pickin [1974] AC 765 (HL) at [15] [Pickin].  
62 Trevor Allan The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution, and Common Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2013) at 1. 
63 For an overview, see Tom Mullen “Reflections on Jackson v Attorney General: Questioning Sovereignty“ 
(2007) 27 LS 1 at 8 et seqq.  
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(a) Legal theory: The manner and form argument 
 
With reference to legal theory, some scholars challenge the positive limb of Dicey’s doctrine, 
arguing on the basis of Ivor Jennings that Parliament itself is in a way able to bind itself 
procedurally in a “self-embracing” way, by having the possibility of legislating special 
manner and form requirements for certain specified types of future legislations (“manner and 
form argument”).64 Therefore, in their view, although Parliament may not be able to place 
restrictions on future contents of legislation,65 it may well introduce procedural requirements 
that are binding on future Parliaments like an alteration of an Act only by referendum or by a 
certain majority of both Houses (and royal assent). Future Parliaments would accordingly not 
be able to amend legislation by the ordinary procedure but only by a special procedure. 
Precedents can be found in cases concerning colonial legislatures only.66 Thus, the manner 
and form doctrine lacks widespread acceptance: By saying that precedents have only 
concerned non-sovereign colonial legislatures, critics argue that these precedents could not be 
seen as persuasively underlining the practical implication of the manner and form theory with 
regard to the sovereign British Parliament.67  
 
Not only have some critics rejected that theory as inapplicable to the UK but also the British 
government.68 But what about the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949? It is well accepted that 
these Acts set certain conditions for Parliament concerning the method in which (future) 
legislation can be enacted without the consent of the House of Lords.69 Establishing 
procedural requirements for the House of Commons to “overrule” the House of Lords,  these 
Acts are widely accepted and have been abided by ever since their enactment, a factor which 
implies that these Acts may well be considered as procedural entrenchments, putting the 
manner and form theory into practice and challenging the orthodox position of Parliament.70 
Therefore, in a way, unofficially, the manner and form argument is applied in British 
constitutional law in spite of the government’s official denial of the application of that theory.  
 
 
                                               
64 See e.g. John Mitchell Constitutional Law (2nd ed, Green, Edinburgh, 1968) at 74 et seqq.; great overview 
over manner and form theory given by Geoffrey Marshall Constitutional Theory (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1971) at ch 3.  
65 Nevertheless, some theorists even advocate for such a radical position by saying that a substantive 
entrenchment may be justified on the basis of unchangeable higher human values, see overview given by 
Loveland above n 53, at 34 et seq. This view is not very popular in the UK since it implies that a nation would 
be “stuck with particular values forever”, see Loveland, above n 53, at 35. 
66  See e.g. Attorney-General for New South Wales v Trethowan [1932] AC 526 (PC) for New South Wales, 
Harris v Dönges (Minister of the Interior) [1952] 1 TLR 1245 for South Africa and Bribery Commissioner v  
Ranasinghe [1965] AC 172 (PC) for British Ceylon, cases in which legislation was declared invalid on the 
ground that it had not been compliant with procedural requirements set by Parliament. 
 67 See e.g. Ronald Ekins “Acts of Parliament and the Parliament Acts” (2007) 123 LQR 91 at 101. 
68 See e.g. Government’s White Paper for the Human Rights Act 1998 “Rights Brought Home: The Human 
Rights Bill” [1997] CM 3782 at [2.16].  
69 See e.g. reasoning in  the Jackson case on these Acts, above n 2. 
70 So e.g. Han-Ru Zhou “Revisiting the ‘Manner and Form’ Theory of Parliamentary Sovereignty” (2013) 129 
LQR 610 at 637. Note that the procedure established by these Acts does not apply to parliament as ordinarily 
constituted, but only to the House of Commons.  
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(b) Legal practice: Accession to the EU and “1998 legislation” 
 
With reference to the UK’s legal practice over the years, its accession to the EU and the 
“1998 legislation” are two major events that are said to be limiting the sovereignty of 
Parliament.71 
 
Firstly, it has been argued that the UK’s accession to the European Union rendered possible 
by the European Communities Act 197272 has placed limitations to its Parliamentary 
sovereignty.73 Section 2 (1) and (4) of this Act are of particular importance: According to 
section 2 (1) ECA all EU obligations arising by or under the EU treaties “are without further 
enactment to be given legal effect”. Section 2 (4) refers back to section 2 (1) and states that 
“any enactment passed or to be passed, other than one contained in this part of this Act, shall 
be construed and have effect subject to the foregoing provisions of this section”.  
 
This wording leaves some room to interpretation as to whether EU law is supreme or equal to 
domestic law as the provisions do not explicitly prohibit the UK Parliament to enact 
conflicting legislation. Initially, the UK courts held that EU law and UK domestic law were 
of equal status and that it was up to Parliament to decide to which of them courts should give 
effect.74 The House of Lords finally acknowledged in its famous Factortame (No 2)75 
decision in 1991 that priority must be given to EU law over domestic law. The House of 
Lords clearly stated that the UK accepted with its membership to the European Union that the 
EU law is supreme over UK national law where the EU has competence.76 The Act of 
Parliament in question, the Merchant Shipping Act 1988, was therefore disapplied in that 
case after the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had ruled that the House of Lords would have 
no other chance than to set aside this Act, as the UK was obliged to do so by the loyal duty of 
member states to the EU laid down in article 5 of the EEC Treaty77.78  
 
However, apart from this general consensus, there is still a huge debate if Parliament retains 
the power to legislate contrary to its obligations arising out of its membership in the EU.79 In 
this context, it is noteworthy that in addition to its famous Factortame decision, the House of 
Lords has declared other Acts of Parliament incompatible with EU law.80 Legislation 
contrary to EU law is therefore somewhat ineffective as it can be said to have no practical 
                                               
71 Note that these two developments should not be seen exclusively. In fact, there is other important legislation 
that can be seen as challenging the Diceyan view, like the Supreme Court Act 2005 (UK). 
72 European Communities Act 1972 (UK) [ECA]. 
73 See e.g. William Wade “Sovereignty – Evolution or Revolution?” (1996) 112 LQR 568 at 574 et seq.  
74 See e.g. HP Bulmer & Anor v Bollinger & Ors [1974] Ch 401 (CA). 
75 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd and Others (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603  (HL) 
[Factortame No 2]. 
76 At 4, per Lord Bridge.  
77 Since 2009 laid down in article 4 (3) of Treaty on European Union (TEU). 
78 Case C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame [1990] ECR I-2433. 
79 Overview given by Loveland, above n 53, at 402 et seqq. 
80 See e.g. R v Secretary of State for Employment, ex p Equal Opportunities Commission [1995] 1 AC 1 (HL). 
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application in the UK. Thus, Parliament’s freedom to legislate whatsoever must be 
considered as being limited by EU law. 
 
Another question in this context is if UK courts are able to disapply a statute aiming at 
withdrawing the UK from the EU. On this point, the Thoburn case81 is of particular 
importance, in which Laws LJ stated in obiter that in contrast to “ordinary” statutes the ECA 
has to be seen as a higher “constitutional” statute which cannot be repealed by implication.82 
This line of argumentation in the Thorburn case can be seen as a form of arguing for 
substantial entrenchment of the legislation of the ECA and might be questioned with regard 
to the British constitutional system. The essence of this case for the purpose of this paper, 
however, is that it indicates that an express repeal of the ECA seems to be possible in order to 
withdraw the UK from the EU. 
 
In my view, it is not necessary to decide if the view expressed in Thoburn withstands scrutiny 
or not. Obligations for the courts to judicially review domestic legislation with EU law – 
including attempts at withdrawing the UK implicitly or explicitly from the EU - simply arise 
out of the British accession to the EU itself and its international treaty obligations 
incorporated into domestic law by the ECA.83 The creation of a new legal order84 has to be 
accepted by all the member states of the EU – even the eurosceptics. The only possibility for 
the UK of enacting legislation contrary to EU law would be to formally opt out of the EU 
according to the procedure laid down in the Lisbon treaty.85 Regardless of this clear legal 
background of international law, this point remains controversial in the UK. Thus, the 
academic debate continues as to whether the accession of the UK to the EU has actually 
limited the Diceyan idea of legislative supremacy or not.  
 
Secondly, some proponents of the modern view argue that Parliament86 has placed some 
restrictions on its own power by incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights 
into domestic law by the Human Rights Act 199887 and by passing devolution legislation in 
1998 (1998 legislation):88 First, under the HRA, legislation “must be read and given effect in 
a way which is compatible with the Convention rights”89, which means that UK courts are 
granted the power to render declarations of incompatibility in cases where legislation is not 
                                               
81 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin), [2003] QB 151. 
82 At 62 et seq. 
83 Note that in the jurisprudence of the ECJ the primacy of European Union law over the domestic law of 
member states is seen as given by the autonomous European Communities legal system itself rather than by the 
various national legal systems, see e.g. Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L [1964] ECR 585 [Costa v E.N.E.L.] 
and Case 26-62 NV Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos  v Netherlands Inland 
Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 1. 
84  See Costa v E.N.E.L, above n 83, at 593 et seq.  
85 See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community [2007] OJ C 306/1, art 50.  
86 Under the political agenda of New Labour and the government of Tony Blair. 
87 Arguing that it created a new legal order similar to the European Union law; see e.g. reasoning of Lord Steyn 
in Jackson case, above n 2, at [102]. 
88 See e.g. Gavin Little “Scotland and Parliamentary Sovereignty” (2004) 24 LS 540; for an overview over these 
two developments in the UK promoting the modern view, see Ogorek, above n 37, at 151 et seqq. 
89 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), s 3 (1). 
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convention-compliant.90 Second, in 1998, under the influence of the Blair government, the 
Westminster Parliament granted some of its powers to three subnational authorities, namely 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The three parliaments in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland,91 which resulted from the devolutionary process, can make or unmake laws 
for their territories in certain devolved areas,92 a factor which has been seen as limiting the 
sovereignty of the UK Parliament. 
 
However, even though the UK Parliament granted some of its powers to different bodies, the 
aforementioned line taken by some theorists is not convincing - in contrast to the real limition 
imposed by the accession to the EU mentioned before - as these grantings cannot really 
challenge Parliamentary sovereignty since the ultimate power in these two cases still lies with 
the UK Parliament: First, section 3 (2) of the Human Rights Act 1998 clearly states that the 
UK Parliament is not bound by the Convention.93 Second, similarly, the UK Parliament 
cannot only continue to make laws for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland but it also 
retains the power to abolish the devolutionary parliaments any time.94 In addition, it must be 
noted that the UK Parliament embodied sections in the devolutionary acts concerning the 
respective countries which enable the UK Supreme Court to fully judicially review 
legislation made by the devolutionary bodies - the power of striking down legislation 
included.95  
 
Nevertheless, some of these theoretical powers of the UK Parliament might be said to be 
politically unenforceable: with regard to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), as the Belmarsh decision has shown in 2005,96 the (external) political pressure on 
the UK - if found to have violated the ECHR - by the European Court of Human Rights 
necessarily leads to the acceptance of the UK Parliament, making it alter domestic law 
incompatible with Convention rights;97 with regard to the devolutionary Parliaments, it is the 
                                               
90 See Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), s 4. 
91 Namely the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly. 
92 Establishment of parliaments via the following acts: Scotland Act 1998 (UK), Government of Wales Act 1998 
(UK), and Northern Ireland Act 1998 (UK). See generally Dawn Oliver “The United Kingdom Constitution in 
Transition: From where to where?” in Mads Andenas and Duncan Fairgrieve  (ed) Tom Bingham and the 
Transformation of the Law: A Liber Amicorum (Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2009) 147 at 160 
et seq., who argues that the devolution process might have increased the wish for independence in these states. 
Note in this context that a referendum is intended in Scotland for its independence before the end of 2014,  see 
The Scottish Government “Agreement between the UK government and the Scottish government on a 
referendum on independence for Scotland” (15 Oct 2012) <www.scotland.gov.uk>. 
93 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), s 3 (2)(b): “This section does not affect the validity, continuing operation or 
enforcement of any incompatible primary legislation.” 
94 Ogorek, above n 37, at 154.  
95 See e.g. Scotland Act 1998 (UK), s 29. 
96 See A (FC) and Others (FC) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 
AC 68 [Belmarsh] in which the House of Lords held that an indefinite detention of non-national terrorist 
suspects under part IV of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK) was incompatible with the 
European Convention on Human Rights as being discriminatory and disproportionate. As a result, Parliament 
repealed this part of the Act in 2005, see Kent Roach The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism 
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011) at 280. 
97 See Dominic McGoldrick “The Human Rights Act 1998 in Theory and Practice” (2001) 50 ICLQ 901 at 946. 
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(internal) political pressure nowadays which makes an abolition of these devolutionary 
Parliaments highly unlikely.98 
 
2 Restrictions Imposed by the Common Law: The CLC Theory 
Apart from the aforementioned self-restrictions, a theory in between political and legal 
constitutionalism99 has been developed in recent years, known as “common law 
constitutionalism”.100 Common law constitutionalists claim that there are fundamental values 
embedded in the common law, like the rule of law, human rights or democracy that pose 
restrictions on the sovereignty of Parliament.101 According to their theory, as “democratic 
decision-making cannot be legitimate if it violates certain fundamental rights”, the courts 
“ought to have the final authority to identify and interpret these [fundamental] rights”.102  
Scholars favouring the CLC theory103 have developed various justifications for their view. 
The major arguments in favour of common law constitutionalism can be summed up as 
follows:104 
 Fundamental values evolved over time from the long-lasting common law 
decision-making 
 Common law is a species of moral reasoning 
 Common law adjudication is the exemplar of public reason 
These arguments can be classified into two categories, the first one being a descriptive one 
from history and both the latter ones being normative arguments.  
(a)  The descriptive argument of history 
Common law constitutionalists often refer to historical material, particularly the judgments of 
Sir Edward Coke in the 17th century or the development of the ultra vires reasoning in order 
to argue that fundamental values have evolved over time from the long-lasting common law 
decision-making, which has aimed at counteracting the (legislative) abuse of power.105 
                                               
98 Concerning the Scottish Parliament see Little, above n 88, at 541. 
99 Gardbaum, above n 27, at 25 et seqq. 
100 Note that this theory is not limited to the UK, see e.g. David Strauss “Common Law Constitutional 
Interpretation“ (1996) 63 U Chi L Rev 877 for the US. 
101 See e.g. Trevor Allan Law, Liberty and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism  
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993). Also referred to as “strong common law constitutionalism“ as opposed to 
“weak common law constitutionalism“, according to which the common law cannot invalidate legislation but 
only control its interpretation, see overview given by Jeffrey Goldsworthy “Unwritten Constitutional Principles” 
in Grant Huscroft (ed) Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory  (Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 2008) 277 at 289 et seqq. 
102 See Tamas Gyorfi “Between Common Law Constitutionalism and Procedural Democracy“ (2013) 33 OJLS 
317 at 318. Note that he himself is of the opinion that the desirability of substantial limits does not automatically 
allow for judicial review of legislation, see at 333. 
103 See particularly e.g. Trevor Allan “Legislative Supremacy and Legislative Intention: Interpretation, Meaning, 
and Authority“ (2004) 63 CLJ 685; John Laws “Law and Democracy” [1995] PL 72 at 87; Lord Woolf of 
Barnes “Droit Public – English Style” [1995] PL 57 at 67 et seqq. 
104 Taken from Thomas Poole “Back to  the Future? The Theory of Common Law Constitutionalism“ (2003) 23 
OJLS 435 at 439 et seqq. 
105  See overview given by Poole, above n 104, at 444 et seq. 
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Trevor Allan, one of the strongest advocates of the CLC theory, makes reference to Coke’s 
famous obiter dictum in Dr Bonham’s Case in 1609, which is mentioned above.106 Others 
refer to judgments made by Coke in Bagg’s Case107 in 1615 as well as in Rooke’s Case108 in 
1598, in which the courts made limiting public power a concern. 
In Rooke’s Case Lord Coke stated: 109 
Notwithstanding the words of the commission give authority to the commissioners to do 
according to their discretions, yet their proceedings ought to be limited and bound with the 
rule of reason and law. 
John Laws comes to the conclusion that this statement of Coke may well illustrate the 
ongoing concerns of the courts to limit public (executive) power in the name of reason and 
law long before Wednesbury110 and thus  imply that there is a “moral basis upon which the 
common law … necessarily operates”.111 
In Bagg’s Case, which dealt with the disfranchisement of the chief burgess James Bagg on 
grounds of showing disrespect towards the Major and Commonalty, the court issued a 
remedy (writ of certiorari) merely on common law grounds. In this context, Lord Coke said 
the following:112 
This Court of King’s Bench belongs … authority, not only to correct errors in judicial 
proceedings, but other errors and misdemeanours extra-judicial, tending to the breach of the 
peace, or oppression of the subjects, or to the raising of faction, controversy, debate, or to any 
manner of misgovernment; so that no wrong or injury, either public or private, can be done 
but that it shall be (here) reformed or punished by due course of law. 
Dawn Oliver argues that this case may serve as an early example of the application of 
common law values by the courts to counteract abuse of power in the way of upholding 
common law rights and providing remedies to avoid injustice that might lead to civil 
disorder.113 In her view, “the true basis of the jurisdiction in judicial review … is the common 
law’s ancient function in putting injustices right”.114 
Hereafter, all the advocates of the CLC theory historically demonstrate that the  “17th century 
ancient constitutionalism” -although modified- strongly parallels the “present-day common 
                                               
106 Allan, above n 101, at 267 et seqq. 
107 James Bagg’s Case (1615) 11 Co Rep 93b, 77 ER 1271 (KB) [Bagg’s Case]. 
108  Rooke’s Case (1598) 5 Co Rep 99b, 77 ER 209 (Comm Pleas). 
109  At 100a. 
110 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA). 
111 John Laws “Wednesbury” in Christopher Forsyth and Ivan Hare (ed) The Golden Metwand and the Crooked 
Cord: Essays on Public Law in Honour of Sir William Wade QC (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998) 185 at 190 et 
seq. 
112 Bagg’s Case, above n 107, at 98a. 
113 Dawn Oliver Common Values and the Public-Private Divide  (Butterworths, London, 1999) at 52. 
114 At 44. 
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law constitutionalism”.115 The underlying historical reasoning seems to be that because of its 
uncodified character the British constitution has always been a matter of the common law. 
It must be noted that the references to Coke are not persuasive enough to underline the CLC 
theory since - due to the controversial meaning of certains terms (as has been mentioned 
before) - Coke’s view on the relationship between the courts and the legislature is not clear. 
Nonetheless, references to passages like the dictum in Dr Bonham’s Case or the judgments in 
the other cases can very well serve as historical examples of seeing the common law as the 
origin of justice, having developed fundamental principles over time in order to protect the 
governed people against public authorities. 
One of the strongest opponents to the CLC theory, Goldsworthy, argues historically against 
the underlying reasoning that it was in fact the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty that had 
always been seen as “above” the common law within the last centuries. Although 
acknowledging that especially in the 17th century there was the claim that the common law 
should be considered as the ultimate political source, Goldsworthy notes that it must not be 
overlooked that there were also other considerable claims that the ultimate political source 
was the King or rather the “community represented in Parliament”.116 These arguments put 
forward by Goldsworthy might be legitimate but are not convincing enough to undermine the 
CLC theory. They just let us come to the conclusion that the descriptive argument of 
historical evidence of common law constitutionalism is weak and cannot be the ultimate 
argument for the justification of the CLC theory as there have always been other claims in 
history as well. 
(b)  Normative arguments 
Therefore, it is important to evaluate the two normative arguments brought forward by the 
CLC theorists:  
First of all, philosophical essentialists argue in favour of common law constitutionalism, by 
saying that - while aiming at achieving a “good constitution” - the common law is a species 
of moral reasoning needed for the protection of the individual’s rights.117 Their premise is 
that “moral fittingness” is the “ultimate criterion for the legitimate exercise of political 
power”.118 Unlike ordinary political institutions like the democratic legislature, courts are 
seen as necessarily moral institutions, which have “no programme, no mandate, no popular 
vote”119 and are therefore translating Kant’s imperative for the individual’s best against 
powerful institutions into legal principle. 120  
The assumption taken by essentialists that courts are necessarily moral institutions superior to 
Parliament is challenged by critics who claim that Parliament could equally proclaim this 
                                               
115 Poole, above n 104, at 447. 
116 Goldsworthy, above n 55, at 34 and 46. 
117 See e.g. John Laws “The Constitution: Morals and Rights” [1996] PL 622 at 623. 
118 See Poole, above n 104, at 448. 
119 Laws, above n 111, at 200 et seq. 
120 Laws, above n 111, at 192. 
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moral authority itself.121 In my view, even though the assumption that courts are necessarily 
moral institutions is proven wrong by examples in (recent) history122, they can be said to be 
more likely moral institutions than legislative bodies since they are neither dependent on the 
popular vote nor on the requirement to vote in accordance with party policy and supposed to 
be impartial. 
Secondly, the legal philosopher Trevor Allan takes up the aforementioned idea123 and 
develops it as follows:  He classifies the common law as a body of “public reason” and 
argues that it is the rule of law behind the court rulings that leads to litigant-driven and 
inherenty rational adjudication.124 This line taken by Allan resembles Ronald Dworkin’s idea 
of “moral readings” of written supreme constitutions.125 Similar to Dworkin126 Allan argues 
that neither the texts of (written supreme) constitutions nor ordinary primary legislative texts 
can be read only in their originalist meaning. On the contrary, these relevant texts must be 
interpreted in context: “The true meaning of any textual provision is ultimately a matter of its 
correct application (or disapplication) in the infinite variety of circumstances arising from 
time to time.”127 Accordingly, public reason in Allan’s theory is ideally performed by 
“ordinary courts, deciding cases at common law”.128 Judgments are seen as a chance of 
“debate over political morality that nourishes, and draws on, the common law”.129 This idea, 
in turn, is similar to Rawls’ idea of the function of constitutional courts performing public 
reason.130 
Allan justifies restrictions imposed by the common law on the sovereignty of Parliament by 
saying that “the common law is prior to legislative supremacy, which it defines and 
regulates”.131  This latter view has been criticised as being a false premise.132 Whereas it is 
uncontested that the source of Parliament’s authority cannot be derived from any statute as 
there is none claiming that and as this body cannot confer its powers upon itself, 133 it is 
highly controversial if the assumption that its source must be the common law is correct. 
Again, it is Goldsworthy arguing against it historically and philosophically. As shown above, 
his historical argument that there were other claims in the past of the UK is not convincing 
enough to undermine Allan’s view. However, his philosophical argument is more compelling 
and is therefore is worth evaluating in detail: 
                                               
121 Goldsworthy, above n 55, at 53. 
122  See e.g. judgments of German courts under Nazi regime. 
123 See Poole, above n 104, at 442 and 449. 
124 Trevor Allan Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law  (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
New York, 2003) at 286 ff. See for this reasoning also Lon Fuller “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” 
(1978) 92 Harv L Rev 353, whose work formed the basis of Allan’s theory. 
125 Poole, above n 104, at 444. 
126 Compare Ronald Dworkin “The Forum of Principle” (1981) 56 NYU L Rev 469.  
127 Trevor Allan “Text, Context, and Constitution: The Common Law as Public Reason” in Douglas Edlin (ed) 
Common Law Theory (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007) 185 at 203. 
128 Allan, above n 124, at 290. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Compare John Rawls Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, New York, 1993) at 231 et seqq.  
131 Allan, above n 124, at 271.  
132 See e.g. Goldsworthy, above n 55, at 46 et seqq. 
133 At 46 and 51. 
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Goldsworthy rightly observes that before challenging the CLC theory a preliminary question 
must be what constitutes the common law. He identifies four different conceptions of the 
nature of the common law, of which the following two are the relevant ones: firstly, the legal 
positivist approach, according to which the common law is purely understood as judge-made 
law and secondly, the Dworkinian approach, whereby the common law is “a coherent body of 
norms, resting on fundamental principles of political morality, which the judiciary has 
authority to identify and expound”134.135  
With regard to the legal positivist approach, Goldsworthy explains that the common law 
understood in positivist terms cannot justify the claim that the common law is above 
Parliament.136 Arguing in line with the positivist Herbert Hart,  Goldsworthy emphasises that 
the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty has not been created by the judiciary but has been 
accepted, as a rule of recognition, by all the three branches of government.137 Therefore, an 
alteration of this principle could only take place if all the branches accepted other criteria as 
law, thus creating a new rule of recognition.138 This argument comprising all three branches 
is convincing since in positivist terms there is no ultimate power conferred only to the 
judiciary. With no reference to higher law the power of the judges cannot stand above the 
democratic will of the governed people represented in Parliament, a principle established by 
the rule of recognition. However, if one bears in mind the risks the positivist theory implies, 
not asking for legal principles to be just or reasonable, but just accepting them as political 
factors, Goldsworthy’s positivist approach can hardly be accepted from a liberal democratic 
constitutionalist’s point of view. Liberal democracy demands for the protection of 
individuals’ rights, especially minorities’ rights by means of a system of checks and balances 
between the three branches of government. Consequently, the rule of law and other 
fundamental just and reasonable values must accordingly be safeguarded – even from 
majority’s decisions.139  
With regard to the Dworkinian approach, Goldsworthy explains that the common law 
conceived in Dworkinian terms is not capable of justifying common law constitutionalism by 
saying that it is neither consonant with “official practices and understandings”140 nor 
consistent with “the nature of fundamental unwritten constitutional rules”.141 It must be noted 
that this argumentation comes from Goldworthy’s positivist point of view. According to 
Dworkin, law must be conceived as integrity, consisting of positivist rights and duties as well 
as of deeper principles of “justice, fairness and procedural due process that provide the best 
constructive interpretation of that community’s legal practice”.142 Since according to 
Dworkin every legal system is based on abstract principles of political morality, this idea can 
                                               
134 At 50. 
135 At 49 et seq. 
136 At 50. 
137 At 54. 
138 At 55. 
139  See Jeffrey Jowell “Parliamentary Sovereignty under the New Constitutional Hypothesis” [2006] PL 562 
 at 575.  
140  At 52. 
141  At 55. 
142 Ronald Dworkin Law’s Empire (Fontana Press, London, 1986) at 225.  
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be considered to be underlying the UK’s constitutional order.143 Therefore, the common law 
conceived in Dworkinian terms as used by Allan144 and others is well apt to justify the CLC 
theory. Even Goldsworthy concedes that the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty is – at 
least inter alia - a fundamental principle of the common law.145  
(c) Overall reasoning 
Considering all the arguments, one can sum up that the overall reasoning of the CLC theorists 
allowing for judicial review of legislation while constraining the sovereignty of Parliament 
withstands scrutiny. The overall reasoning of this theory is well described by Thomas Poole: 
Common Law, in this [i.e. the CLC theorist’s] account, is necessarily moral, the exemplar of 
public reason, and has a continuous and evolutionary history. Legislation, by contrast, is 
amoral, imperfect as a mode of public reason, and both transient and potentially capricious.146 
C Result: Parliamentary Sovereignty under Attack  
The aforementioned examples of the modern view show that Parliamentary sovereignty has 
been under attack during the previous decades. Consequently, the orthodox view of Dicey 
seems incompatible with certain practical developments in the UK, like the legal 
consequences of its accession to the EU, as well as with certain theoretical developments in 
the UK, like the promotion of the common law constitutionalism.147  
Academics – especially from legal constitutionalists’ countries - refer to these developments 
having taken place over the last 40 years in the UK as a process of “juridification” and 
“judicalisation” that has challenged the traditional model of Parliamentary sovereignty.148 
The model of political constitutionalism in the UK has been called into question and a 
demand for an increased role of judicial review of legislation in the UK has been 
developed.149  
Whereas the restrictions caused by Parliament itself can only temporarily challenge but not 
infinitely limit the sovereignty of Parliament since the possibility of withdrawing from the 
limitations ultimately lies with the legislative branch,150  the restrictions imposed by the 
common law according to the CLC theory constitute real limitations on the principle of 
Parliamentary sovereignty as the common law – seen as a somewhat supreme source - cannot 
be controlled by Parliament.  
 
                                               
143 Ibid. 
144 See e.g. Trevor Allan, above n 62, at 166 et seq. 
145 Goldsworthy, above n 55, at 56. 
146  Poole, above n 104, at 450. 
147 Distinction between practical and theoretical side of development taken from Gardbaum, above n 27, at 23. 
148 See e.g. Gernot Sydow “Der geplante Supreme Court für das Vereinigte Königreich im Spiegel der britischen 
Verfassungsreformen” [2004] ZaöRV 65 at 67 et seq. (translation: “The British Government’s Plans for a UK 
Supreme Court and the British Constitutional Reforms”). 
149 Gardbaum, above n 27, at 23; see generally Tomkins, above n 46, at 23 et seq., who enumerates three reasons 
for the “collapse of the Diceyan constitutional order” since the 1970s.  
150 The membership in the EU might be seen differently, see above under III.B.1.b. 
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IV Analysis of the CLC Practice in the UK  
A   Juridical Reception of the CLC Theory 
In the following, it will be examined how far the CLC theory has gained practical reception 
by the judiciary.  
Before the Jackson case in 2005, the (former) House of Lords had only hinted at this theory 
from time to time by generally saying that there might be fundamental rights constraining 
Parliament.151 However, judges also held in these particular cases that these fundamental 
rights could be invaded by the clearest expression of legislative intention.152  
1  Jackson Case (2005): The Power of Judicial Review  
The obiter dicta in Jackson153  in 2005 lifted the judicial reception of the CLC theory onto 
another level, going beyond the previous rulings by endorsing the position that courts may 
have the authority to strike down legislation where found to be incompatible with 
fundamental common law rights.154 
(a) Principal facts of the case  
The Jackson case dealt with the question whether the Hunting Act 2004, which made it an 
offence to hunt wild mammals with dogs155, was a valid Act of Parliament.156 The 
constitutional significance of that case was the fact that the Hunting Act was forced through 
without the consent of the House of Lords using the procedure under the Parliament Act 
1949.157  
As briefly explained before, the Parliament Act 1949 stipulates that the House of Lords 
cannot veto but only delay legislation of the House of Commons for up to one year. 
According to the 1949 Act, in cases where the bill in question has been passed in the House 
of Commons in two successive parliamentary sessions it can become an Act of Parliament 
even without the consent of the House of Lords when Royal Assent is given.158 The 1949 Act 
itself was passed using the procedure of the Parliament Act 1911 which, for the first time, 
had reduced the power of the House of Lords to delaying legislation by abolishing its veto 
right and only allowing for a maximum delay of two years in cases where the House of 
Commons has passed the bill in three successive sessions.159  
                                               
151 Woolf, above n 103; Laws, above n 103. 
152 See e.g. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Leech [1994] QB 198 (CA) [Leech]; R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 (HL) [Simms]; R v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, ex p Daly  [2001] UKHL 26, [2001] 2 AC 532 [Daly].  
153 Jackson, above n 2. 
154 Mullen, above n 63, at 13. 
155 Hunting Act 2004 (UK), s 1. 
156 Jackson, above n 2, at [1]. 
157 See [1]. 
158 Parliament Act 1949 (UK), s 1. 
159 Parliament Act 1911 (UK), s 2. 
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Mr Jackson160 claimed that the Parliament Act 1911161 could not lawfully be used to amend 
itself but that an amendment of this Act needed the formal consent of the House of Lords.162 
Accordingly, the appellants challenged the validity of both the Parliament Act 1949 and the 
Hunting Act 2004.163  
After the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal had rejected this claim,164 the House of 
Lords decided in Jackson in 2005 unanimously that the enactment of the Parliament Act 1949 
had been validly passed under the procedure laid down in the Parliament Act 1911 and that 
consequently the Hunting Act 2004 likewise was a valid Act of Parliament.165  
(b) Obiter dicta concerning the CLC theory 
The remarkability of the Jackson case lies apart from the central issue of the ruling: the  
obiter dicta in that decision concerning the CLC theory and arguing for the power of judicial 
review of legislation in the UK.166 Some judges in the Court of Appeal had indicated before 
that there might be situations in which it would be legitimate for courts to disapply 
Parliamentary legislation on constitutional grounds.167 
Lord Steyn, Lord Hope and Baroness Hale were the three judges of the House of Lords who 
in more or less clear terms referred to the CLC theory and generally expressed a modern view 
on the role of the judiciary in the UK and the sovereignty of Parliament doctrine. By making 
direct and indirect references to legal theory (manner and form argument) and legal practice 
of Parliament’s self-restrictions like the aforementioned constitutional developments in the 
UK due to European obligations and domestic processes, they all stated that the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty had changed since Dicey. Furthermore, they all agreed that there 
are limits on the sovereignty of Parliament to be found in the common law, imposed by the 
rule of law or respectively by various fundamental principles embedded in the common law, 
thus taking up the idea of the CLC theory. Consequently, they all inferred a power of the 
judiciary to review legislation of Parliament including the possibility of striking it down. 
Their views on the legitimacy and extent of judicial review of legislation, however, varied. 
 
 
                                               
160 A member of the Countryside Alliance, an organisation in Britain promoting “country sports activities“ like 
hunting or shooting. 
161 Precisely the bypassing procedure laid down in section 2 (1) of the Parliament Act 1911, see Jackson, above 
n 2, at [1 and 7]. 
162 See Jackson, above n 2 , at [1 and 7]. 
163 At [2]. 
164 See R (on the application of Jackson & Ors) v Her Majesty’s Attorney General [2005] EWHC 94 and R (on 
the application of Jackson & Ors) v HM Attorney General [2005] EWCA Civ 126, [2005] QB 579.  
165 See  Jackson, above n 2. Note that with regard to the reasoning that the Parliamentary Acts 1911 and 1949 
establish a form of procedural requirement for enacting legislation, most of the judges agreed (implicitly or 
explicitly) on the validity of the manner and form theory. On this point see Zhou, above n 70, at 622 et seqq. 
166 Five out of nine judges of the panel of the House of Lords considered that point more or less clearly, namely 
Lord Bingham, Lord Steyn, Lord Hope, Baroness Hale and Lord Carshwell. 
167 Drawing a distinction between “modest” and “fundamental” constitutional amendments, see R (on the 
application of Jackson & Ors) v HM Attorney General, above n 164, at  [98-100]. 
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(i)  Lord Steyn 
Lord Steyn made the following statement:168 
The classic account given by Dicey of the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, pure and 
absolute as it was, can now be seen to be out of place in the modern United Kingdom. 
Nevertheless, the supremacy of Parliament is still the general principle of our constitution. It 
is a construct of common law. The judges created this principle. 
Having expressed that the supremacy of Parliament is a construct of the common law made 
by the judges themselves, he went on to state that the House of Lords may reconsider the 
position that courts have no power to strike down legislation:169 
It is not unthinkable that circumstances could arise where the courts may have to qualify a 
principle established on a different hypothesis of constitutionalism. In exceptional 
circumstances involving an attempt to abolish judicial review or the ordinary role of the 
courts, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords or a new Supreme Court may have to 
consider whether this is a constitutional fundamental which even a sovereign Parliament 
acting at the behest of a complaisant House of Commons cannot abolish.  
Lord Steyn therefore saw fundamental principles embedded in the common law as the 
ultimate controlling factors of the constitution, upon which judicial review of legislation 
including the power to strike it down might be justified. Although he did not explicitly refer 
to English legal theory, Lord Steyn’s line of reasoning seems to refer to Allan, according to 
whom the common law is prior to legislative supremacy. Therefore, despite being somewhat 
vague, Lord Steyn’s argumentation in itself seems to refer to the idea of deeper principles, 
described as “constitutional fundamentals” stemming from the common law, which is behind 
positivist laws. He emphasises that the judges’ power to set aside Acts of Parliaments should 
only be exercised in exceptional circumstances. 
(ii)  Lord Hope 
Lord Hope,170 expressed his view as follows:171 
Parliamentary sovereignty is no longer, if it ever was, absolute. … Step by step, gradually but 
surely, the English principle of absolute legislative sovereignty of Parliament which Dicey 
derived from Coke and Blackstone is being qualified. 
In his statement, Lord Hope affirmed the modern view expressed by Lord Steyn on the 
principle of Parliamentary sovereignty and the legitimacy of judicial review of legislation. 
His argumentation is equally based on the premise of the common law having created the 
principle of Parliamentary sovereignty.172 Instead of invoking fundamental constitutionals 
like Lord Steyn, Lord Hope argued that it was specifically “the rule of law enforced by the 
                                               
168 Jackson, above n 2, at [102]. 
169 Ibid (emphases added). 
170 Scottish Law Lord. 
171 At [104]. 
172 See [126]: “The principle of parliamentary sovereignty…has been created by the common law”. 
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courts” which was the ultimate controlling factor on which the UK constitution was based.173 
By invoking the rule of law as the fundamental principle of the constitution, his Lordship 
implicitly abandoned the Diceyan view on this principle of being subordinate to the 
supremacy of Parliament. His Lordship concluded that “the courts have a part to play in 
defining the limits of Parliament’s legislative sovereignty”.174  
Lord Hope’s obiter dictum is highly valuable in that he was the only one explicitly referring 
to English legal theory in his argumentation. He stated that “there [was] a strong case for 
saying that the rule of recognition … is itself worth calling ‘law’ and for applying it 
accordingly”.175 It seems that he favoured the positivist approach of Hart, which is commonly 
used to argue for the orthodox view on Parliamentary supremacy as the most fundamental 
law in the British constitution.176 However, in the following, he critically evaluates this 
positivist approach of  Hart’s concept of law, by saying that “it must never be forgotten that 
this rule, which is underpinned by what others have referred to as political reality, depends 
upon the legislature maintaining the trust of the electorate”.177 Thus, Lord Hope’s statement 
on the power of judicial review is said to implicitly favour the Dworkinian approach of “law 
as integrity” which has been used by scholars like Allan to argue for a modern view on the 
principle of sovereignty by promoting the CLC theory.178 However, it is not clear if his 
Lordship consistently based his argumentation on the premise of the common law in 
Dworkinian terms or in positivist terms. The Dworkinian proponent Allan himself criticises 
that Lord Hope is “reluctant to pursue the logic of his insight”.179  
Besides, it is worth mentioning that unlike CLC theorists, Lord Hope presents Coke as a 
defender of the orthodox view on Parliamentary sovereignty in line with Blackstone and 
Dicey and not as an early supporter of the idea that the court can limit the power of 
Parliament. Therefore, it seems that Lord Hope does not with the historical argument 
concerning Coke’s influence or the ancient 17th constitutionalism but only with the normative 
arguments brought up by CLC theorists. 
(iii) Baroness Hale 
Baroness Hale stated the following:180 
The concept of Parliamentary sovereignty which has been fundamental to the constitution of 
England and Wales since the 17th century … means that Parliament can do anything. The 
courts will, of course, decline to hold that Parliament has interfered with fundamental rights 
unless it has made its intentions crystal clear. The courts will treat with particular suspicion 
(and might even reject) any attempt to subvert the rule of law by removing governmental 
action affecting the rights of the individual from all judicial scrutiny.  
                                               
173 At [107]. 
174 Ibid. 
175 At [126]. 
176 Mullen, above n 63, at 16 et seq. 
177 Jackson, above n 2, at [126]. 
178 See Mullen, above n 63, at 20 et seq.  
179 Allan, above n 62, at 144. 
180 At [159] (emphasis added). 
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Thus, her Ladyship concurred with Lord Hope by referring to the rule of law as the ultimate 
controlling factor of Parliamentary Acts. Baroness Hope puts special emphasis on the 
protection of the individual’s rights. By saying that courts might even reject attempts to 
subvert the rule of law, her Ladyship explained what the CLC theory’s consequence would 
be: granting judges the power to strike down legislation when necessary. However, it seems 
that - unlike the other two judges- she puts her statement into perspective, by saying that 
generally, the constraints upon Parliament are “political and diplomatic rather than 
constitutional.”181  
(iv) Overall significance of the obiter dicta 
To conclude, the line taken by the “modernists” Lord Steyn, Lord Hope and Baroness Hale 
can be said to generally pick up on the idea of the CLC theory: Whereas the normative 
arguments underpinned more or less clearly their line of argumentation, the descriptive 
historical argument was only partly invoked by Lord Steyn and Lord Hope, stating that 
parliamentary sovereignty was the creation of the common law but not making particular 
reference to the 17th century ancient constitutionalism. 
In  a way, the obiter dicta in the Jackson case by Lord Steyn, Lord Hope and Baroness Hale 
highlight the long-lasting conflict in the UK’s constitutional law between Parliamentary 
sovereignty and the rule of law and conclude that the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty 
is relative and that the ultimate power within the constitutional system lies with the rule of 
law respectively fundamental principles embedded in the common law to be determined by 
the courts.  
However, it cannot be ignored that in Jackson Lord Bingham and Lord Carshwell referred to 
the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty in an orthodox Diceyan view.182 Lord Carshwell 
clearly rejected the modern view expressed by Lord Steyn, Lord Hope and Baroness Hale, 
stating that he and his Lordships do not “wish to expand the role of the judiciary at the 
expense of any other organ of the State”.183 Lord Bingham, who referred to the principle of 
Parliamentary sovereignty as “the bedrock of the British constitution”184, however, admitted 
in his judgment that judicial review with regard to the Parliament Acts was justified for the 
benefit of protecting the appellant’s rights  - by referring to the rule of law.185 Therefore, even 
the traditionalist Lord Bingham invoked the rule of law as a justification for judicially 
reviewing Acts of Parliament “under the guise of statutory interpretation” since the points 
raised by the appellants otherwise could not have been resolved  at all.186  
                                               
181 Ibid.  
182 See  [9] and [168]. 
183 At [168]. This same somewhat reluctant view on the role of courts towards judicial review of Parliamentary 
Acts was also expressed by Lords Nicholls. Instead of invoking the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty he 
referred to the case of Pickin, which was a “reflection to art 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689: ‘…proceedings in 
Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court’”, see [49]. 
184 At [9]. 
185 At [27].  
186 Jowell, above n 139, at 577. 
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To sum it up, the Jackson case “marks a significant staging post” in the development of the 
UK constitution187 in that judges their official role have referred to the CLC theory as a 
justification for judicial review of legislation in the UK. 
2 After Jackson: Reception in Subsequent Cases?  
The CLC theory and the reasoning of Jackson were again referred to in AXA v Lord 
Advocate188 in 2011,  a case which - inter alia -  dealt with the question if the judiciary had 
the power to repudiate an Act of the Scottish Parliament on common law grounds.  
The factual background of this case was the 2007 decision of the House of Lords, Rothwell v 
Chemical and Insulating Company & Ors,189 which stated that no damages in tort could be 
claimed for a health condition called pleural plaques which result from exposure to asbestos. 
Aiming at reversing that decision for Scotland, the Scottish Parliament enacted the Damages 
(Asbestos-related Conditions) (Scotland) Act 2009190, according to which a person suffering 
from pleural plaques caused by an exposure to asbestos would have the right to get 
compensation. Against this backdrop, AXA and other insurance companies, whose business 
it is to indemnify employers for any of their liabilities arising out of negligent actions, 
challenged the validity of the Damages Act by invoking not only Convention rights191 but 
also common law rights.192 The UK Supreme Court dismissed the claim of AXA and upheld 
the validity of the Damages Act. 
Against this factual background, the legal issue arose whether the Damages Act of the 
devolved Scottish Parliament could be judicially reviewed on common law grounds of 
unreasonableness, irrationality or arbitrariness with regard to the legislative authority 
conferred on the Scottish Parliament by the Scotland Act 1998.193 In this context, the views 
expressed by Lord Hope and Lord Reed are of particular importance with regard to the 
reception of the CLC theory: 
Apart from the devolutionary context, Lord Hope generally stated that the orthodox view on 
the supremacy of the UK Parliament was currently under attack. His Lordship referred to 
Lord Steyn as the strongest supporter of a modern view on the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty, advocating for a stronger role of the judiciary.194 Even though he did not 
explicitly subscribe himself to Lord Steyn, he implicitly favoured his view by referring to the 
Jackson case and by repeating his own former statement in Jackson that the “rule of law 
enforced by the courts is the ultimate controlling factor on which our [e.g. the British] 
                                               
187 Mark Elliot “Case and Comment: The Sovereignty of Parliament, the Hunting Ban, and the Parliament Acts”  
(2006) 65 CLJ 1 at 4. 
188 AXA General Insurance v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] 1 AC 868  [AXA v Lord Advocate]. 
189 Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating Company & Ors [2007] UKHL 39, [2008] AC 281. 
190  Damages (Asbestos-related Conditions) (Scotland) Act 2009. 
191 If an Act is incompatible with the ECHR it is automatically outside the legislative competence of the 
devolved Parliament according to the Scotland Act 1998 (UK), s 29 (2)(d). 
192 Axa v Lord Advocate, above n 180, at [1]-[2] and [17]. 
193 See claim of appellants at [17]. The particular question which arose here was if the courts possessed the 
power to intervene not only on grounds specified in the section 29 (2) of the Scotland Act 1998 but also on other 
grounds, namely common law grounds. 
194 At [50]. 
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constitution is based”.195 Therefore, six years after Jackson, Lord Hope affirmed the judicial 
reception of the CLC theory, according to which fundamental values like the rule of law 
embedded in the common law pose limitations on the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty. 
At the same time, Lord Hope made clear that the obiter dicta expressed by Lord Steyn, 
Baroness Hale and himself in Jackson had to be interpreted in a way that the judges’ power to 
strike down legislation was admissible in exceptional circumstances only.196 Judicial review 
on common law grounds of unreasonableness, which were invoked by the appellants with 
regard to the Scottish case in question, on the other hand, could be seen as the other extreme 
of the exercise of judicial review of legislation.197  
Lord Reed referred to the CLC theory in AXA v Lord Advocate by saying that there are 
fundamental rights embedded in the common law and the rule of law, enabling judicial 
review of legislation.198 However, it must be noted that he referred to this idea of the CLC 
theory with regard to the devolutionary non-sovereign Scottish Parliament only and not with 
regard to the sovereign Westminster Parliament. 
In short, even though the aforementioned views were expressed in a devolutionary context, 
where judicial review of legislation is possible on statutory grounds like the Scotland Act 
1998, the statements of Lord Hope and Lord Reed, who generally agreed on the possibility of 
having judicial review on common law grounds as well, can be seen as revitalising the CLC 
theory. Lord Hope’s statements, in which he particularly referred to the UK Parliament, 
underline the on-going concern of some judges of the highest court in the UK to implement 
the idea of the CLC theory. It must be noted that the emphasis in AXA v Lord Advocate was 
that the CLC theory, according to which judges are justified to set aside an Act of the UK 
Parliament, could be applied in exceptional circumstances only.199 However, as Lord Hope’s 
view concerning the CLC theory was only expressed in obiter, it cannot be said that there is a 
full reception of the CLC theory in the jurisprudence. Therefore, it might be “simplistic to 
assume that judgments like Lord Hope’s in AXA foreshadow an era of judicial supremacism 
entailing legal curtailment of legislative authority”.200 Nonetheless, there is a tendancy to a 
more frequent invocation of fundamental principles embedded in the common law, especially 
the rule of law, in terms of justifying judicial review of legislation in the UK. 201 
 
 
 
                                               
195 At [51]. 
196 At [43]. 
197 Ibid. 
198 See [149]-[153] 
199 See [43]. 
200 Elliot, above n 187, at 11. 
201 Note that the same applies to New Zealand, where the CLC theory has been promoted over the last decades 
especially by Sir Robin Cooke, see e.g. his statement in Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board [1984] 1 NZLR 
394 (CA) at 398: “Some common law rights presumably lie so deep that even Parliament could not override 
them”.  
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B CLC Practice from a Legal Constitutionalist’s Point of View 
1 Comparison wirh Constitutional Principles of Codified Supreme Constitutions 
A question that arises with regard to the reception of the CLC theory is whether the UK is 
gradually developing “constitutional principles” similar to those of states favouring legal 
constitutionalism. 
As mentioned before, the idea of CLC advocates the invocation of fundamental principles 
embedded in the common law as a form of higher law justifying judicial review of legislation 
including the possibility of invalidating legislation. The rule of law is one of these 
fundamentals, advocated for by Lord Hope several times. Other principles like human rights 
or the principle of democracy have been identified as fundamental principles as well in the 
UK.202  
Consequently, it can be argued that a shift is taking place in the UK from a political 
constitution to a principled constitution.203 But are these principles similar to “constitutional 
principles” of written supreme constitutions? In order to answer this question, I will 
exemplarily refer to the constitutional principles laid down in the German Basic Law. The 
core constitutional principles can be found in art 20 of the German Basic Law, two of them 
being the principle of  democracy and the principle of the rule of law (“Rechtsstaaat”).204 The 
rule of law is the principle which is mainly referred to in CLC practice and which constitutes 
“the bedrock of liberal democratic constitutionalism”.205 Thus, the meaning of this particular 
principle will be examined in the context of German constitutional law in the following. 
Art 20 (3) of the German Basic Law stipulates that the rule of law (“Rechtsstaat”) is one of 
the core constitutional principles of the German constitution. This principle means that “the 
legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive and the judiciary by law 
and justice”.206 Art 20 (3) reflects the idea of a supreme constitution binding all the three 
branches, an idea which is also explicitly expressed in art 1 (3) of the German Basic Law,207  
which provides as follows: “The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law.”  
Against this background, the rule of law principle invoked in CLC practice must be 
evaluated: In contrast to the orthodox Diceyan view, the rule of law is referred to by CLC 
practitioners as a higher value, being not only above the law of the UK Parliament but also 
above all the three branches of government since it is a moral principle. Insofar, the rule of 
                                               
202 See e.g. Leech, Simms and Daly, above n 152; see also Thoburn, above n 81, at [62]. Great overview of 
judicial recognition of constitutional rights in the UK in Jeffrey Jowell “Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards 
Constitutional Judicial Review” [2000] PL 671 at 674 et seqq. 
203 See e.g. Oliver, above n 92,  at 147 et seqq. 
204 See Basic Law 1949 (Germany), art 20 (2) for the principle of democracy and art 20 (3) for the principle of 
the rule of law.  
205 Trevor Allan, above n 62, at 1. 
206 Basic Law 1949 (Germany), art 20 (3). 
207 Roman Herzog, Rupert Scholz, Matthias Herdegen and Hans Klein (eds) Maunz/Dürig: Grundgesetz-
Kommentar (online looseleaf ed, C.H.Beck, Munich 2013), art. 20 (3) at [2] (translation: German Basic Law 
Commentary). 
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law as higher law according to CLC theorists and practitioners can be said to reflect the idea 
of the rule of law established by codified supreme constitutions like the German one, which 
ultimately derives its legal principles from moral authorities.208  
Similar considerations can be made in terms of other fundamental values embedded in the 
common law like the principle of democracy and human rights. They all can be said to have 
equivalents in codified supreme constitutions.209 As core values in liberal democratic 
communities,210 these principles represent the universality of human dignity, freedom, 
equality and justice.211  
Therefore, with regard to the reception of the CLC theory, one can argue that the UK is 
gradually developing “constitutional principles” stemming from the common law which are 
similar to those stemming from codified supreme constitutions and allowing for judicial 
review of legislation including the possibility of invalidating legislation. 
2 Comparison with the Principle of Judicial Self-Restraint in Legal Constitutionalism 
A second comparative question is if the CLC system is similar to legal constitutionalist 
systems with judicial self-restraint. According to the CLC theory, the judges’ power to strike 
down Acts of Parliament is allowed on the grounds of fundamental principles embedded in 
the common law in exceptional circumstances only. It has to be examined if the condition of 
"exceptional circumstances" can be equated with the principle of judicial self-restraint in 
legal constitutionalist systems. 
The principle of judicial self-restraint is not inherent in legal constitutionalism. However, in 
order to respect the role of the legislature as the law- and policy-making-power, the principle 
of judicial self-restraint is more and more promoted in these countries, contrasting with the 
phenomenon of “judicial activism”. Constitutional judges in several legal constitutionalist 
countries have committed themselves to a form of judicial self-restraint, varying from a weak 
one to a strong one: whereas the US’s judicial approach can be described as a weak form of 
judicial restraint, the courts generally taking a very activist approach,212 Nordic European 
countries pursue this concept in a very strong form, their judges having rarely declared 
primary legislation invalid.213 Germany’s approach can be seen as comparatively moderate: 
One the one hand, it has judges who are legally authorised by the constitution to strike down 
legislation and who therefore represent great authorities, whose judgments have “profound 
                                               
208 See for higher (natural or divine) law with regard to the German Basic law Herzog, above n 207, preamble, at 
[17]-[18]. See more generally Isabelle Ley “Kant versus Locke: Europarechtlicher und völkerrechtlicher 
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influence on legal and political developments in the country”.214 On the other hand, the 
judges acknowledge at the same time that enough latitude must be left to the legislative 
branch for free policy-moulding.215 
The general concept of judicial self-restraint was well expounded by Justice Frankfurter in a 
dissenting opinion in Trop v Dulles in 1958, an American case that dealt with the question of 
whether new legislation was compatible with the US constitution:216 
This legislation is the result of an exercise by Congress of the legislative power vested in it by 
the Constitution, and of the exercise by the President of his constitutional power in approving 
a bill and thereby making it ‘a law’. To sustain it is to respect the actions of the two branches 
of our Government directly responsible to the will of the people and empowered under the 
Constitution to determine the wisdom of legislation. The awesome power of this Court to 
invalidate such legislation, because in practice it is bounded only by our own prudence in 
discerning the limits of the Court’s constitutional function, must be exercised with the utmost 
restraint. 
This reference shows that the general idea of judicial self-restraint is that the judges show 
deference to the legislative branch and make sure that their role does not go further than 
applying the law of the democratic legislative body instead of making laws themselves.217 In 
this context, it is noteworthy that one of the early judicial (self-) restraint advocates, the 
American law professor James Bradley Thayer, famously stated in 1893 that a legislative 
statute should be struck down only if its unconstitutionality arose from a mistake of the 
legislature which was - “beyond a reasonable doubt”- 218 “so clear that it [was] not open to 
rational question”.219  
This line taken by Thayer, which can be said to be best implemented by the Nordic European 
legal constitutionalist countries nowadays, is similar to the judicial reluctance expressed by 
the judges in Jackson and Axa v Lord Advocate with regard to the UK: the CLC theorists’ 
approach of requiring “exceptional circumstances” concerning the invalidation of primary 
legislation embodies the same idea of judicial self-restraint as the one advocated by legal 
constitutionalist judges in countries with a strong form of judicial self-restraint. Therefore, as 
a matter of practice, the CLC approach seems to be similar to a legal constitutionalist system 
in countries with a strong judicial self-restraint. 
 
 
                                               
214 Koopmans, above n 22, at 69. 
215 See e.g. BVerfGE 36, 1 [1973] NJW 1539, where the principle of “judicial self-restraint” was invoked by the 
constitutional court in an important judgment concerning the political question of treaty-making power of the 
Federal Republic of Germany with the German Democratic Republic in 1973. Note that the English technical 
term of “judicial self-restraint” was even used by the German court. 
216 Trop v Dulles, Secretary of State 356 US 86 (1957) at 128 [Trop v Dulles]. 
217 See Posner, above n 212, at 520 et seq. 
218 See Posner, above n 212, at 523. 
219 James Thayer “The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law” (1893) 7 Harv L Rev 
129 at 144. 
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V Conclusion  
In contrast to the introductory quotation, according to which there is no basis for judicially 
review legislation in the UK, the previous analysis has led to the conclusion that similar to 
constitutional courts in countries pursuing legal constitutionalism, the UK Supreme Court can 
legitimately review the UK Parliament’s statutes including the possibility of striking them 
down in exceptional cases, as there are fundamental common law principles against which 
the courts can review the laws. I myself subscribe to the view of the English lecturer and 
barrister Pavlos Eleftheriadis who states: “All legally organised parliaments have limited 
powers. The Westminster Parliament has constitutionally limited powers, very much like its 
German and American counterparts.”220 
From a comparative point of view, the system of the common law constitutionalism in the 
UK is not very different from the system of legal constitutionalism: Firstly, fundamental 
principles embedded in the common law like the rule of law are similar to constitutional 
principles of codified supreme constitutions, providing for benchmarks of judicial review of 
legislation. Secondly, the requirement of exceptional circumstances for invalidating 
legislation in the CLC system corresponds to the idea of (strong) judicial self-restraint in 
legal constitutionalist systems. 
The results found are unexpected against the background of the UK’s model of political 
constitutionalism.  Traditionally, in line with Dicey, this model did not provide for judicial 
review of legislation since the sovereignty of Parliament was regarded as being absolute, thus 
considered to be the utmost principle of the British constitution. However, this model has 
been modified by the CLC theory, which has challenged the orthodox view on the principle 
of parliamentary sovereignty and has provided for a greater role of the judiciary in terms of 
reviewing legislation. 
The promotion of the CLC theory has to be seen in the context of self-imposed restrictions by 
the UK Parliament, like the enactment of the ECA 1972 or the incorporation of the ECHR 
into domestic law through the HRA 1998, which generally contributed to a modern view on 
the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, therefore demanding for judges’ power to review 
legislation of the UK Parliament in certain areas. The original reluctance of courts to review 
legislation of Parliament has changed within the last decades due to these developments. The 
courts’ power to declare legislation incompatible with EU law or the Convention or rather 
even invalidate legislation of devolutionary Acts of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
may have led to a different approach of the courts with regard to their competences. In the 
wake of these newly gained powers, the idea of fully reviewing primary legislation of the UK 
has gained wider acceptance and consequently led to the judicial reception of the CLC 
theory: The obiter dicta of Lord Steyn, Lord Hope and Baroness Hale in Jackson concerning 
this theory can be seen as “a significant staging post” in the development of the UK 
constitution221 in that they officially highlight the idea of having the common law (or 
fundamental principles thereof) as the ultimate controlling factor and justification for judicial 
                                               
220 Eleftheriadis, above n 50, at 267. 
221 Elliot, above n 187, at 4. 
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review of legislation in the UK. More recent cases like AXA v Lord Advocate foreshadow that 
the courts in exceptional circumstances may well invalidate an Act of the UK Parliament in 
cases where the rule of law or another fundamental common law principle are at stake.  
This development may be seen as a lesson learnt from history, meaning that this idea of 
limiting Parliament’s power is an increasing desire of the British resulting from the people’s 
experiencing “the great tyrannies of the 20th century [that] had already demonstrated the 
dangers of unconfined power, regardless of whether it was sanctioned by popular consent”.222  
The CLC theory, which is based on abstract principles of political morality as the ultimate 
controlling factor of the constitution may well fit into the UK’s uncodified constitutional 
system and provide for safeguards against the abuse of Parliament’s power. To conclude, a 
strong form of judicial review of legislation in the UK hereafter is not only possible but can 
also be legitimately exercised as the flexibility of the UK’s constitution allows for judges 
striking down legislation when necessary.223 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
222 Jowell, above n 139,  at 578.  
223 Compare Edmund Thomas “The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts: A Tentative Thought or Two for 
the New Millennium” (2000) 31 VUWLR 5 at 8 for same line of argumentation concerning New Zealand. 
Contrast Oliver, above n 92, at 152, who thinks that the practice of judicial disapplication of Acts of the UK 
Parliament would not work in the British unwritten constitution and the British constitutional culture. 
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